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Lessons and Liabilities in Litigating 
Solitary Confinement 
KERAMET REITER 
This Essay reviews the recent deluge of legal attention solitary 
confinement has received in the United States, focusing in particular on 
three legal cases: Davis v. Ayala (a U.S. Supreme Court case), Coleman v. 
Taylor (a case filed and recently dismissed in a federal district court in 
Illinois), and Ashker v. Brown (a settled case filed in a federal district 
court in California). A close analysis of the reasoning in each of these 
cases provides a framework for examining the changing landscape of 
prison reform litigation in what many are heralding as a new era of 
reform. Together, these cases reveal one critical, changing mechanism of 
success in reform litigation: in each of the three cases, lawyers have 
leveraged careful investigative reporting and collective action by prisoners 
in changing not just the legal conversation, but also the public attitude 
towards isolation. This reveals the growing importance of what I call 
“multi-method” approaches to reform litigation. However, the reforms 
being sought and implemented are, perhaps, neither so drastic nor so 
sustainable as critics of solitary confinement might hope. In light of the 
history of solitary confinement, three lessons have been ignored and 
deserve further scrutiny: the persistence of solitary, the opacity of solitary, 
and the administrative discretion governing solitary. 
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Lessons and Liabilities in Litigating 
Solitary Confinement 
KERAMET REITER* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For advocates of solitary confinement reform (and abolition), 2015 
was a red-letter year. The Supreme Court, local federal courts across the 
United States, and multiple federal and professional agencies scrutinized 
U.S. solitary confinement practices, levied incisive criticisms, and initiated 
reform dialogues. Perhaps most dramatically, in June 2015, Justice 
Kennedy wrote a concurrence in Davis v. Ayala in which he explicitly 
invited challenges to the types of conditions of long-term solitary 
confinement in which Hector Ayala (whose death sentence the Court 
upheld) had been housed for over twenty-five years.1 Just two weeks later, 
three Illinois prisoners filed a class action complaint on behalf of all 
50,000 prisoners in the state. The complaint alleged that all Illinois 
prisoners faced “a substantial risk of receiving arbitrary, disproportionate, 
harmful, and unjustified extreme isolation sentences as a result of IDOC’s 
[the Illinois Department of Corrections’] policies and customs in violation 
of the United States Constitution.”2 Prisoners in isolation alleged that their 
conditions of confinement violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment and that the procedures for their 
placement in isolation violated the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of 
due process protections of liberty interests.3 And just two months after that, 
in August 2015, the California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation signed a sweeping settlement agreement in Ashker v. Brown, 
a class action lawsuit brought on behalf of all the prisoners in the state who 
had been in solitary confinement for ten years or more. Among other 
things, the settlement set a strict limit of five years on any and all terms of 
                                                                                                                          
* Keramet Reiter, Assistant Professor, Department of Criminology, Law & Society, and School of 
Law, University of California, Irvine; Ph.D. in Jurisprudence and Social Policy, University of 
California, Berkeley 2012; J.D., University of California, Berkeley School of Law 2009; M.A., John 
Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York 2006; B.A., Harvard University 2003. I 
appreciate the helpful comments and dialogues, which took place during the November 2015 
Connecticut Law Review Symposium on prison reform. 
1 Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (Kennedy, J., concurring), reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 14 
(2015). 
2 Complaint at 1, 33, 46, Coleman v. Taylor, No. 1:15-cv-05596 (N.D. Ill. June 24, 2015). 
3 Id. at 35–36. 
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solitary confinement in the state.4  
Then, in September 2015, the Association of State Correctional 
Administrators (ASCA), in collaboration with the Arthur Liman Public 
Interest Program at Yale Law School, issued a report describing conditions 
in “restrictive housing” (a catch-all term for various forms of isolation, 
segregation, and solitary confinement) and estimating the numbers of 
prisoners held in such conditions across the United States.5 In October 
2015, the Bureau of Justice Statistics issued its own report attempting to 
estimate the number of people in some form of “restrictive housing.”6 The 
Justice report was issued in conjunction with the convening of a National 
Institute of Justice topical working group on the use of administrative 
segregation in the United States.7 By the end of 2015, the Marshall Project, 
itself a new investigative journalism platform founded in the fall of 2014 to 
“create and sustain a sense of urgency about criminal justice in America,” 
reported that solitary confinement reform would be one of three key 
criminal justice trends to watch in the coming year.8 Advocates of legal 
reform have every reason to pay attention, but what role will litigation play 
in this new reform paradigm, and how sustainable are these reforms likely 
to be? 
Prior to 2015, the law on solitary confinement seemed depressingly 
settled. In 1995, in the first federal court case to consider the 
constitutionality of long-term solitary confinement in technologically 
advanced, modern supermax facilities, a notoriously liberal district court 
judge in the Northern District of California upheld the constitutionality of 
solitary confinement in extremely restrictive conditions of confinement, 
even for indefinitely long durations.9 And in 2005, the only time the U.S. 
                                                                                                                          
4 Settlement Agreement at 12, Ashker v. Brown, No. 4:09-cv-05796-CW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 
2015) (on file with author). 
5 LIMAN PROGRAM & ASS’N OF STATE CORRECTIONAL ADM’RS, TIME-IN-CELL: THE ASCA-
LIMAN 2014 NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION IN PRISON ii (2015) [hereinafter 
TIME-IN-CELL], https://www.law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/liman/document/asca-liman_admin 
istrativesegregationreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/U832-ELQA]. 
6 ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USE OF RESTRICTIVE HOUSING IN U.S. PRISONS AND 
JAILS, 2011–12, at 1 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=5433 [https://perma.cc/W 
7KS-LV37]. 
7 Nancy Rodriguez, Director’s Corner: Setting the Agenda for Administrative Segregation 
Research, NAT’L INST. JUSTICE (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.nij.gov/about/director/Pages/rodriguez-
adminstrative-segregation.aspx [http://web.archive.org/web/20151030031209/http://www.nij.gov/about 
/director/Pages/rodriguez-adminstrative-segregation.aspx]. 
8 Mission Statement, MARSHALL PROJECT, https://www.themarshallproject.org/about?via=nav 
right#.uQlls50ha [https://perma.cc/QP3Y-LV5J] (last visited Apr. 2, 2016); Andrew Cohen, Next Year 
in Criminal Justice: Three Themes That Will Trend, Three That Won’t, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 21, 
2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/12/21/next-year-in-criminal-justice [https://perma.cc/ 
MSZ6-KM39]. 
9 Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp 1146, 1265 (N.D. Cal. 1995); see also Keramet Reiter, 
Supermax Administration and the Eighth Amendment: Deference, Discretion, and Double Bunking, 
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Supreme Court considered long-term solitary confinement in supermax 
facilities, the Court found that the limited procedural protections governing 
placement in the Ohio State Prison (a supermax) were adequate to protect 
the prisoners’ acknowledged liberty interest in not being placed there.10 
The original issue in Wilkinson v. Austin, of whether the Ohio supermax 
violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment, was resolved within the lower courts (which ordered some 
reforms to existing conditions) and was not considered by the Supreme 
Court.11 
Incidentally, Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the unanimous 
court in Wilkinson.12 But Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Davis, along 
with the statewide, class action litigation in Illinois and California, 
suggested an unsettling of these precedents. 
High-profile criticisms of the widespread and long-term use of solitary 
confinement in the United States bubbled up over the five years prior to 
Kennedy’s concurrence in Davis. In 2009, Jean Cassella and James 
Ridgeway founded Solitary Watch, a web-based project to investigate 
solitary confinement and consolidate resources on the topic; the site now 
has hundreds of thousands of visitors per year.13 The American Civil 
Liberties Union founded a national Stop Solitary campaign in 2012,14 
following on the heels of the U.N. Special Rapporteur’s explicit 
condemnation, in 2011, of any term in solitary confinement lasting longer 
than fifteen days.15 In 2011 and again in 2013, tens of thousands of 
California prisoners participated in hunger strikes, explicitly protesting 
conditions in solitary confinement.16 In 2012 and 2014, Democratic 
Senator Dick Durbin hosted two congressional hearings critically 
evaluating the practice of solitary confinement throughout U.S. prisons.17 
                                                                                                                          
1986–2010, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 89, 93 (2015) (discussing Madrid v. Gomez and its impact on 
subsequent cases). 
10 Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 213 (2005); see also Keramet Reiter, The Most Restrictive 
Alternative: A Litigation History of Solitary Confinement in U.S. Prisons, 1960–2006, 57 STUD. L. 
POL. & SOC’Y 71, 114–15 (2012). 
11 Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 218. 
12 Id. at 212. 
13 See SOLITARY WATCH, http://solitarywatch.com/ [http://web.archive.org/web/2016041416023 
9/http://solitarywatch.com/] (last visited Apr. 2, 2016). 
14 See We Can Stop Solitary, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/feature/we-can-
stop-solitary?redirect=stop-solitary-resources-advocates [https://perma.cc/4ES8-W6RH] (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2016). 
15 Solitary Confinement Should Be Banned in Most Cases, UN Expert Says, U.N. NEWS CENTRE 
(Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40097 [https://perma.cc/PC5H-UR 
AC]. 
16 Keramet Reiter, The Pelican Bay Hunger Strike: Resistance Within the Structural Constraints 
of a US Supermax Prison, 113 S. ATLANTIC Q. 579, 579–81 (2014). 
17 See Durbin Commends President Obama's Leadership in Addressing Solitary Confinement, 
U.S. SEN. DICK DURBIN (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/durbin 
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Even in late 2014, however, the conversation about solitary confinement 
was primarily political. That changed in 2015, when large-scale litigation 
about conditions of solitary confinement suddenly seemed viable.  
The three 2015 federal cases of Davis v. Ayala, Coleman v. Taylor, and 
Ashker v. Brown together signal the possibility for sweeping legal 
reconsiderations of the practice of solitary confinement, especially in its 
longer-term iterations, across the United States. A close analysis of the 
context in which each case arose and of the reasoning underlying the 
litigation, settlement, and opinions in these cases, provides a framework 
for examining the changing landscape of prison reform litigation in what 
many are heralding as a new era of reform.18 Together, these cases reveal 
critical, changing mechanisms of success in reform litigation. In each of 
the three cases, empirical scholarship, careful investigative reporting, and 
even collective action by prisoners, have been integral parts of the 
litigation and legal reasoning underlying the cases. This exemplifies the 
growing importance of what I call “multi-method” approaches to reform 
litigation. However, the reforms Justice Kennedy called for in Davis, the 
ones being sought in Coleman, and the ones being implemented in Ashker,  
are, perhaps, neither so drastic nor so sustainable as critics of solitary 
confinement might hope. In light of the history of solitary confinement, 
each of these cases ignores three lessons, which deserve further scrutiny: 
the persistence of solitary, the opacity of solitary, and the administrative 
discretion governing solitary.  
In the first three parts of this Essay, I introduce each of the three 
landmark 2015 cases and analyze the context for and reasoning in each, 
identifying the multi-method approaches along with the historical blind 
spots visible between the lines of the legal reasoning. In the fourth part, I 
summarize the “lost lessons” of prior reform and suggest how they might 
be better incorporated into future litigation efforts. 
                                                                                                                          
-commends-president-obamas-leadership-in-addressing-solitary-confinement [https://perma.cc/FB8S-
PLTM] (detailing Senator Durbin’s condemnation of solitary confinement in two hearings as Chairman 
of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights). 
18 See, e.g., Eli Hager & Gerald Rich, Shifting Away from Solitary: More States Have Passed 
Solitary Confinement Reforms This Year than in the Past 16 Years, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 23, 
2014), http://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/23/shifting-away-from-solitary [https://perma.cc/ 
V4SV-6GDM] (documenting the substantial increase in solitary confinement reforms in 2014 when 
compared to the sixteen years prior); see also David M. Shapiro, To Seek a Newer World: Prisoners’ 
Rights at the Frontier, 114 MICH. L. REV. 124 (2016). 
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II. JUSTICE KENNEDY’S INVITATION TO A BEHEADING19 
In Davis v. Ayala, Justice Kennedy wrote a short concurrence to the 
majority opinion upholding Hector Ayala’s death sentence, which 
Kennedy was “unqualified” in supporting.20 In his concurrence, however, 
Justice Kennedy outlined his response to “one factual circumstance, 
mentioned at oral argument but with no direct bearing on the precise legal 
question presented by this case.”21 Appending this kind of commentary 
with “no direct bearing” on the case at hand was unusual enough, but the 
substance of the commentary was even more surprising. In a short but 
sweeping three-page review, Justice Kennedy summarized the existing 
evidence in literature, law, and science that solitary confinement “exact[s] 
a terrible price” from inciting a “mindless state” to “terror” to “anxiety, 
panic, withdrawal, hallucinations, self-mutilation, and suicidal thoughts 
and behaviors.”22 Justice Kennedy concluded with an invitation to 
prisoners and their advocates to bring a case to challenge (or even behead) 
                                                                                                                          
19 This is a riff on Vladimir Nabokov’s classic novel, INVITATION TO A BEHEADING (Dmitri 
Nabokov trans., Vintage Int’l 1989) (1959) (raising the irrationality of the death penalty as a 
punishment). This reference to Nabokov’s novel as a relevant metaphor for thinking about the secrecy 
and irrationality of extreme punishments builds on the work of Michael Mushlin, who argues that Franz 
Kafka’s classic work In the Penal Colony provides another helpful metaphor for thinking about the 
challenges to reform, especially where bureaucrats lack the power to implement reforms, and punitive 
institutions remain closed off to public oversight. Michael B. Mushlin, “I Am Opposed to This 
Procedure”: How Kafka’s In the Penal Colony Illuminates the Current Debate About Solitary 
Confinement and Oversight of American Prisons, 93 OR. L. REV. 571, 625–26 (2015). 
20 Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2208 (Kennedy, J., concurring), reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 14 
(2015). The central question in Davis concerned the constitutionality of the decades-old death sentence 
of Hector Ayala. In 1985, Hector Ayala, along with his older brother Ronaldo Ayala, was charged with 
murdering three men in a San Diego auto body shop, as part of a robbery. In 1989, in separate trials, 
both brothers were convicted and sentenced to death. ‘Executioner’ of 3 Given Death Sentence, L.A. 
TIMES (Feb. 10, 1989), http://articles.latimes.com/1989-02-10/local/me-2458_1_death-sentence [https:/ 
/perma.cc/LK4L-HAX2]. At Hector Ayala’s trial, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike 
all seven of the eligible African-American and Hispanic jurors in the jury pool. Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 
2193–94. Hector Ayala litigated the racially disparate impact of these challenges for the next quarter of 
a century; in the spring of 2015, the Supreme Court heard arguments in the case. Id. at 2187. In June of 
2015, Justice Alito delivered the 5-4 opinion of the Court: any constitutional error that took place as a 
result of the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges to strike all the minority jurors was “harmless.” Id. at 
2208. The decision reaffirmed the extremely high standard prisoners must meet in order to prove 
constitutional error in an appeal of a death penalty proceeding (and severely limited the Court’s 1986 
holding in Batson v. Kentucky, which had restricted lawyers’ abilities to use peremptory challenges in 
apparently racially biased patterns). See Hadar Aviram, Davis v. Ayala: Post-Conviction Review of 
Batson, Harmless Error, and a Surprising Dignity Opinion from Justice Kennedy, PRAWFSBLAWG 
(June 18, 2015), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/week25/ [https://perma.cc/T2VY-
X4AH], for an analysis of this aspect of the case. Put simply, the holding, supported by the Court’s five 
Republican-appointed justices, sided with the interests of the California courts and prosecutors, and 
against the interests of the death-sentenced prisoner. Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion. 
Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2208 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
21 Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2208 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
22 Id. at 2210. 
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the practice of solitary confinement: “In a case that presented the issue, the 
judiciary may be required, within its proper jurisdiction and authority, to 
determine whether workable alternative systems for long-term confinement 
exist, and, if so, whether a correctional system should be required to adopt 
them.”23 Such an invitation deserves careful scrutiny. What kind of case 
might “present the issue” of whether long-term solitary confinement is 
constitutional, and what kind of “alternatives” might be “required”? 
The evidence Justice Kennedy presents in his concurrence, as well as 
the context in which Davis arose, provide two important insights into the 
kinds of cases that might viably challenge the constitutionality of solitary 
confinement and produce a judicial requirement for the implementation of 
alternatives. First, multi-method approaches will be required to bring a 
case. Second, the history of prior litigation (including litigation in which 
Kennedy himself issued opinions) deserves more attention and 
incorporation into future litigation strategies. 
The sheer range of sources Justice Kennedy references in critiquing 
solitary confinement suggests that any challenge to the practice of solitary 
confinement will necessarily need to mobilize and analyze a wide array of 
expert evidence from history, science, and even the popular media. In two 
concise paragraphs in his concurrence, Justice Kennedy reviews the history 
of solitary confinement: feared in the 1770s in England; characterized as 
permanently, psychologically damaging in popular literature—like 
Dickens’ A Tale of Two Cities—in the mid-nineteenth century; condemned 
as worse than a sentence to death by the U.S. Supreme Court in In re 
Medley in 1890; and criticized by scholars from nearly every discipline 
from law to medicine throughout the twentieth century.24 Later in the 
concurrence, Justice Kennedy describes “a new and growing 
awareness . . . of the subject . . . of solitary confinement,” as exemplified, 
he suggests, by a New Yorker story about Kalief Browder.25 Browder, who 
was sixteen years old at the time of his arrest, spent two years in solitary 
confinement on New York City’s Riker’s Island jail, pre-trial.26 He was 
ultimately released, but he committed suicide one year later.27  
This concise survey of the state of knowledge about solitary 
confinement over time reveals that reforming the conditions of 
                                                                                                                          
23 Id. at 2209. 
24 Id. at 2210. 
25 Id. 
26 See Jennifer Gonnerman, Kalief Browder, 1993–2015, NEW YORKER (June 7, 2015) 
[hereinafter Gonnerman, Kalief Browder], http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/kalief-browder 
-1993-2015 [https://perma.cc/D8QH-KVBW] (recounting the arrest and imprisonment of Browder in 
New York); see also Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, NEW YORKER, Oct. 6, 2014, at 26 
(providing a detailed account of Browder’s experience on Rikers Island and the pre-trial events that 
ultimately led to his release after all charges against him were dropped). 
27 Gonnerman, Kalief Browder, 1993–2015, supra note 26. 
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confinement will require something more than a “case that presents the 
issue” of solitary confinement to the court. The social science evidence 
from doctors as well as from “penology and psychology experts”28 about 
the detrimental effects of solitary confinement, in addition to the 
investigative reports into horrific individual experiences in solitary 
confinement, will be vital pieces of any case presentation, just as they are 
vital pieces of Kennedy’s argument in his concurrence.  
While Justice Kennedy suggests that some of this evidence about the 
detrimental effects of solitary confinement is new, he implicitly 
acknowledges that some of it has existed since the first prisons opened in 
the United States, in the early nineteenth century.29 A particular challenge 
of any new case confronting the practice of solitary confinement, therefore, 
will be reframing and integrating old and new evidence in a way that 
accounts for the persistence of solitary confinement as a correctional 
practice. While details of the practice have changed—such as the size of 
and conditions in isolation cells, the lengths of time spent in isolation, and 
the reasons for being sent to isolation—solitary confinement has existed in 
some form in every prison system in America, from the first penitentiaries 
in Philadelphia and Auburn, to the most modern facilities in California, 
Colorado, and Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.30 Litigation, then, must account for 
the persistence of solitary confinement.  
Kennedy’s own concurrence reveals, and indeed perpetuates, two 
mechanisms of this persistence: lack of transparency and deference to 
prison administrators. In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy indirectly 
acknowledges the opacity of prisons, noting that, after sentencing, 
“[p]risoners are shut away—out of sight, out of mind.”31 But Justice 
Kennedy mistakenly equates this opacity with a lack of attention on the 
part of lawyers and judges to conditions of confinement: “[T]he public 
may have assumed lawyers and judges were engaged in a careful 
assessment of correctional policies, while most lawyers and judges 
assumed these matters were for the policymakers and correctional 
                                                                                                                          
28 Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2210 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
29 See id. at 2209. 
30 For an analysis of the use of solitary confinement in early penitentiaries, see generally 
REBECCA M. MCLENNAN, THE CRISIS OF IMPRISONMENT: PROTEST, POLITICS, AND THE MAKING OF 
THE AMERICAN PENAL STATE, 1776–1941, at 37, 56 (2008) (discussing the uses of solitary confinement 
in the Walnut Street prison (Penn.) and Auburn (N.Y.) throughout the 1700s and 1800s); MICHAEL 
MERANZE, LABORATORIES OF VIRTUE: PUNISHMENT, REVOLUTION, AND AUTHORITY IN 
PHILADELPHIA, 1760–1835, at 193–96, 294–95 (1996) (discussing Walnut Street prison in addition to 
Eastern State penitentiary); Ashley Rubin, A Neo-Institutional Account of Prison Diffusion, 49 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 365, 368–70 (2015) (referencing prior research such as McLennan and Meranze). For an 
analysis of the persistence of the practice in modern facilities, see Reiter, supra note 10, at 78 
(beginning with an analysis of the Walnut Street prison, founded in 1780s Pennsylvania). 
31 Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2209 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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experts.”32 To say that lawyers and judges have “assumed” correctional 
policies were for policymakers and experts is to ignore both the long 
history of litigation in the United States challenging exactly this point,33 as 
well as the frequency with which judges have paid attention to correctional 
policies and found them perfectly acceptable.34  
Justice Thomas argues exactly this point in his own Davis concurrence, 
indicating that he has paid attention to the conditions of confinement in 
which Hector Ayala is being held, and found them to be perfectly 
constitutional—“a far sight more spacious than those in which his victims, 
Ernesto Dominguez Mendez, Marcos Antonio Zamora, and Jose Luis 
Rositas, now rest.”35 Moreover, in Kennedy’s concurrence, describing the 
conditions of solitary confinement Hector Ayala “likely” experienced, he 
cites his own majority opinion in Wilkinson v. Austin, a case in which 
lawyers and judges alike engaged in a “careful assessment” of correctional 
policies governing solitary confinement in Ohio’s supermax.36 Wilkinson, 
in fact, is an example of another case in which judges ultimately found that 
conditions in solitary confinement were perfectly acceptable.37 The 
problem, then, is not a lack of close legal attention to correctional policies, 
but rather the fact that these policies have withstood legal reform efforts. 
One reason why the policies have remained resistant to reform is 
apparent in both Kennedy’s concurrence in Davis and in his earlier opinion 
in Wilkinson: judges evaluating conditions of confinement tend to defer to 
prison administrators, who claim that potentially unconstitutional 
conditions of confinement are necessary to maintain institutional safety 
                                                                                                                          
32 Id. at 2209–10. 
33 See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN 
STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 34, 37 (1998) (describing a change in 
judicial reform in the 1960s); see also Reiter, supra note 10, at 73–74 (examining how courts addressed 
the constitutionality of solitary confinement before supermax prisons were built and then in the two 
decades after the first supermaxes were built). 
34 See, e.g., COLIN DAYAN, THE STORY OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 27–33 (2007) (discussing the 
Court’s deference to legislative “intent” in laws challenged by Eighth Amendment claims); Sharon 
Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881 (2009) 
(arguing that courts look to the crime itself when determining if a state was cruel in the punishment it 
handed down); Sharon Dolovich, Forms of Deference in Prison Law, FED. SENTENCING REP., Apr. 
2012, at 245, 245 [hereinafter Dolovich, Forms of Deference] (addressing deference to state actors 
because their job is complex); Richard H. Fallon Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and 
Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1275, 1277–78 (2006) (addressing the refusal by courts to 
guarantee constitutional rights because of lacking “judicially manageable standards”); Giovanna Shay, 
Ad Law Incarcerated, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 329, 331–32 (2010) (arguing that jail and prison 
regulatory exemptions from federal and state Administrative Procedures Acts create spheres of 
expanded discretion for jail and prison administrators). 
35 Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2210 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
36 Id. at 2208 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 218 (2005)) 
(additional citations omitted). 
37 Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 213 (holding that Ohio’s New Policy for classifying prisoners in 
supermax prisons complied with the Due Process Clause). 
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and security.38 Kennedy himself acknowledges the need for exactly this 
deference in his Davis concurrence: “Of course, prison officials must have 
discretion to decide that in some instances temporary, solitary confinement 
is a useful or necessary means to impose discipline and to protect prison 
employees and other inmates.”39 With the phrase “of course,” Kennedy 
assumes the need for discretion, but he also suggests that the discretion to 
place a prisoner in solitary confinement should be constrained within terms 
that are “temporary” (presumably as opposed to “long-term”). But 
Kennedy does not specify a definitional duration for “temporary.”  
The history of solitary confinement in the United States suggests that 
“temporary” isolation readily becomes long term and semi-permanent, 
especially when prison officials define the conditions under which 
isolation is necessary.40 In fact, throughout the 1970s, California prison 
officials faced challenges to the conditions of solitary confinement in the 
exact Adjustment Center unit in San Quentin where Hector Ayala has been 
in solitary confinement for the past twenty-five years.41 Although federal 
courts in California ordered substantial reforms to the conditions of 
confinement at the Adjustment Center in the 1970s, it remains in operation 
                                                                                                                          
38 See Dolovich, Forms of Deference, supra note 34, at 246 (“[D]eference to prison officials is 
written right into the substantive constitutional standards.”); Reiter, supra note 9, at 93 (“U.S. federal 
courts have held that supermaxes are necessary tools of safety and security, based on the assertions of 
prison administrators that this is the case.”). 
39 Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2210 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
40 See Keramet Reiter, Reclaiming the Power to Punish: Legislating and Administrating the 
California Supermax, 1982–1989, LAW & SOC’Y REV. (forthcoming) (discussing the extended 
lockdowns used in California prisons in the 1970s and institutionalized in the 1980s). For other 
discussions of extended lockdowns, see Toussaint v. McCarthy, 597 F. Supp. 1388, 1422 (N.D. Cal. 
1984) (challenging extended lockdowns in California in the 1970s and 1980s through permanent 
injunction), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 801 F.2d 1080, 1085 (9th Cir. 1986); Adams v. Carlson, 352 F. 
Supp. 882, 886 (E.D. Ill.) (challenging extended lockdowns in Illinois in the 1970s), vacated, 488 F.2d 
619 (7th Cir. 1973); DAN BERGER, CAPTIVE NATION: BLACK PRISON ORGANIZING IN THE RADICAL 
CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 100–01 (2014) (referencing extended lockdown as a prison condition that led to 
uprising of black prisoners); MIKE FITZGERALD, CONTROL UNITS AND THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME 
(1975). 
41 See Reiter, supra note 40 (discussing litigation around extended lockdowns). For references to 
the conditions in San Quentin’s Adjustment Center and Ayala’s housing status there, see Tamar 
Birckhead, Prisoners in Isolation: In Davis v. Ayala, Justice Anthony Kennedy Issues a Call to Action 
in His Discussion of Solitary Confinement, JUV. JUST. BLOG (July 8, 2015), http://juvenilejustice 
blog.web.unc.edu/2015/07/08/prisoners-in-isolation-in-davis-v-ayala-justice-anthony-kennedy-issues-a 
-call-to-action-in-his-discussion-of-solitary-confinement/ [https://perma.cc/SNV5-YTZA] (describing 
exchange between Justice Kennedy and Ayala’s lawyer Anthony Dain about Ayala’s conditions of 
confinement in “administrative segregation”); Nancy Mullane, The Adjustment Center: Where No One 
Wants to Go, KALW LOC. PUB. RADIO (Oct. 22, 2012), http://kalw.org/post/adjustment-center-where-
no-one-wants-go [https://perma.cc/85VK-HTZV] (describing conditions in and the history of the 
Adjustment Center); San Quentin Demands, PRISONER HUNGER STRIKE SOLIDARITY, https://prisoner 
hungerstrikesolidarity.wordpress.com/education/the-prisoners-demands-2/demands-across-the-system/s 
an-quentin-demands/ [https://perma.cc/F86N-8D6F] (presenting open letter signed by Hector Ayala to 
San Quentin officials describing conditions in the Adjustment Center, where Ayala is housed). 
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more than three decades later.42 The San Quentin Adjustment Center, then, 
stands as an example of the fact that lawyers and judges have paid 
attention to conditions of solitary confinement, but that this attention has 
resulted in neither elimination of solitary confinement nor the imposition 
of constraints to make the isolation “temporary.”  
Solitary confinement has not only persisted in spite of litigation, it has 
expanded, with few ameliorations to the harsh conditions that have 
characterized segregation for decades. During oral arguments in Davis, in 
the spring of 2015, Justice Kennedy asked Ayala’s attorney, Anthony 
Dain, about the conditions in San Quentin’s Adjustment Center. Dain 
explained: “It’s a 150-year-old prison and their administrative segregation 
is single cells, a very old system, very small . . . .”43 Dain elaborated, 
describing Ayala’s conditions of confinement: “When I visit him, I visit 
him through glass and wire bars . . . . It is a single cell. . . . You are allowed 
one hour a day [outside the cell].”44 Hector Ayala’s conditions of 
confinement are an example of the persistence of solitary confinement in 
both “very old” and “very small” forms as well as in more modern and 
relatively spacious forms. Notably, only 102 of California’s 746 death-row 
prisoners are housed in solitary confinement in San Quentin’s Death Row 
Adjustment Center.45  
By contrast, more than 3,000 other prisoners in California are held in 
other forms of long-term solitary confinement for terms ranging from a 
few months to more than forty years.46 These 3,000-plus prisoners are 
housed in modern supermax facilities, which were built in California in the 
late 1980s in order to meet minimum space requirements (eighty square 
feet), to provide adequate lighting (fluorescent lights remain on twenty-
four hours per day), and to guarantee an average of an hour per day out-of-
cell time (each eight cells are linked to one exercise yard, called a “dog 
                                                                                                                          
42 See Spain v. Procunier, 408 F. Supp. 534, 539–40 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
600 F.2d 189, 189–90 (9th Cir. 1979) (describing cruel and unusual characteristics of conditions for a 
class of seven plaintiffs). 
43 Birckhead, supra note 41. Contrary to Dain’s implication about the age of the Adjustment 
Center, the isolation facility itself is relatively new within San Quentin; it was built in 1960. Mullane, 
supra note 41. 
44 Mark Joseph Stern, 20 Years in a Windowless Cell, SLATE (June 19, 2015), http://www.slate. 
com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/06/supreme_court_and_solitary_confinement_justi
ce_anthony_kennedy_finds_it.html [https://perma.cc/SQW6-62HL]. 
45 DIV. OF ADULT OPERATIONS, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., DEATH ROW TRACKING 
SYSTEM: CONDEMNED INMATE LIST (2016), http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/capital_punishment/docs/condemn 
edinmatelistsecure.pdf [https://perma.cc/28R5-GCQG]; Howard Mintz, San Quentin: Inside 
California's Death Row, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Dec. 29, 2015), http://www.mercurynews.com/cri 
me-courts/ci_29323310/inside-californias-death-row [https://perma.cc/MAC6-LH64].  
46 Keramet Reiter, Parole, Snitch, or Die: California’s Supermax Prisons and Prisoners, 1987–
2007, 14 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 530, 531 (2012); Ian Lovett, California Agrees to Overhaul Use of 
Solitary Confinement, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/us/solitary-
confinement-california-prisons.html [https://perma.cc/H58L-X7NJ]. 
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run”).47 In California, up until the settlement in Ashker, further discussed 
below, more than 2,000 state prisoners were held in solitary confinement 
indefinitely because of their alleged status as gang members, not because of 
a specific disciplinary violation.48  
Ayala, then, is an exception among death row prisoners for being in 
solitary confinement, and he is an exception among prisoners in solitary 
confinement for being housed in a small, old isolation unit, built half a 
century ago. If the Supreme Court (or any lower court) were to reconsider 
Ayala’s conditions of confinement specifically, any recommended reforms 
could be limited in a variety of ways: to death row prisoners, to cells built 
more than twenty-five years ago, or to prisoners who have spent more than 
ten years, or more than twenty years, in isolation.  
The fact that the Supreme Court even took notice of Hector Ayala’s 
conditions of confinement depended on Ayala’s exceptional circumstances 
as a death-sentenced prisoner in a state that guarantees such prisoners legal 
representation at each stage of the appellate process. Across the United 
States, there are just under 3,000 death-sentenced prisoners, and only a 
small fraction of these are housed in long-term solitary confinement in 
conditions like Ayala’s.49 By contrast, as many as 300,000 prisoners (one 
in every five) across the United States spent time in some form of isolated 
confinement in 2012.50 Although data about this population has not yet 
been systematically collected, preliminary reports suggest that, in some 
states and some prison facilities, the average lengths of such stays in 
isolation can be as long as two to three years.51 In sum, then, the universe 
of cases in which a prisoner is represented by an attorney and gets a 
                                                                                                                          
47 Reiter, supra note 46, at 531. 
48 Id. at 542. 
49 As of January 2016, there were 2,943 prisoners under sentence of death in the United States. 
Death Row Inmates by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-
row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year [https://perma.cc/2WMR-N5DS] (last visited Feb. 3, 2016). 
The exact number of death-sentenced prisoners in solitary confinement is unknown; conditions vary by 
state and are not carefully tracked. In general, however, prisoners on death row have more privileges 
than prisoners in solitary confinement. For instance, death row prisoners, unlike solitary confinement 
prisoners, can usually socialize on “group” exercise yards, make phone calls, visit the law library 
regularly, and even, in some cases, send e-mails. See, e.g., Harrison Jacobs, What It’s Like Inside the 
Terrifying Super-max Prison Where the Boston Bomber Is Expected to Be Executed, BUS. INSIDER 
(May 15, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-super-max-prison-where-the-boston-bomber-will-
be-executed-is-known-as-guantanamo-north-2015-5 [https://perma.cc/THG5-6T42]. 
50 See BECK, supra note 6, at 1 (showing varying demographics of prisoners, at least twenty 
percent of whom spent time in isolated confinement in 2012). 
51 See TIME-IN-CELL, supra note 5, at 28 (“The two jurisdictions reporting the largest percentages 
of prisoners held in long-term segregation were the Federal Bureau of Prisons, which held 58% of the 
prisoners in administrative segregation at ADX Florence (234 out of 404 prisoners) for more than 3 
years, and Pennsylvania, which held 45% of the prisoners in administrative segregation at SCI Greene 
(123 out of 271 prisoners) for more than 3 continuous years.”); Reiter, supra note 46, at 548 (showing 
that the average length of stay in the SHU at Pelican Bay was over two years in 2007). 
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hearing in the Supreme Court, such that the issue of solitary confinement 
can even be “presented,” is vastly smaller than the total number of 
prisoners in long-term solitary confinement across the United States. Most 
prisoners in isolation (but not under sentence of death) have no right to a 
lawyer, no opportunity to put their claims before an appellate court, and 
therefore no chance to describe their conditions of confinement to Justice 
Kennedy.52 
Even when such a case was presented to the Supreme Court, a few 
months after the publication of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Davis, 
the Court declined to hear the case.53 In Prieto v. Clarke, Alfred Prieto, one 
of only eight prisoners then sentenced to death in Virginia, challenged the 
harsh conditions of his permanent solitary confinement and sought a right 
to have his automatic assignment (as a death-sentenced prisoner) to those 
harsh conditions reviewed (and presumably reconsidered) within the prison 
system.54 Alfred Prieto’s case seemed as analogous to Hector Ayala’s as 
possible: a death-sentenced prisoner, held for years (seven) in solitary 
confinement, in conditions only a minority of state prisoners experienced. 
Moreover, Prieto sought a moderate alternative: rather than seeking the 
abolition of solitary confinement, he sought more due process protections 
governing his assignment to solitary confinement.55 The Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals denied Prieto’s request, and Prieto appealed to the 
Supreme Court. On October 1, 2015, while Prieto’s appeal was pending, 
the state of Virginia executed him.56 On October 13, the Supreme Court 
dismissed his petition as moot.57 
Prieto’s case confirms the myriad challenges any one prisoner, even 
one with a lawyer and a right to appeal, will face in actually presenting the 
issue of the constitutionality of long-term solitary confinement to the 
Supreme Court. Moreover, even if Justice Kennedy wants to consider such 
a case, he is likely in the minority. In Davis, even while he invited a case 
that would seek to eliminate (or at least ameliorate) Hector Ayala’s harsh 
                                                                                                                          
52 For a review of the obstacles non-death sentenced prisoners face in bringing challenges to the 
conditions of their confinement, see Keramet Reiter, Making Windows in Walls: Strategies for Prison 
Research, 20 QUALITATIVE INQUIRY 417, 422 (2014). 
53 Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 319 (2015). 
54 Id. at 247. 
55 Id.  
56 Tom Jackman, Triple Murderer Alfredo Prieto Is Executed in Virginia, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/judge-allows-execution-of-alfredo-prieto-
to-proceed/2015/10/01/eaec9f28-67c6-11e5-9223-70cb36460919_story.html [https://perma.cc/PD7K-
VSJ6]. 
57 Prieto, 136 S. Ct. at 319. For an analysis of the case, see Robert Barnes, If Kennedy Is Looking 
for a Solitary Confinement Case, an Inmate Has One, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2015), https://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/if-kennedy-is-looking-for-a-solitary-confinement-case-an-inmate-
has-one/2015/08/09/b59a6444-3e0a-11e5-b3ac-8a79bc44e5e2_story.html [https://perma.cc/64CH-GG 
DA]. 
 2016] LESSONS AND LIABILITIES IN LITIGATING SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 1181 
conditions of confinement in long-term isolation, Justice Kennedy joined 
Justice Alito’s majority opinion, which literally invited the execution of 
Ayala. Justice Kennedy does not acknowledge the incoherence, but Justice 
Thomas does. In what Steve Vladek described as a “curt” paragraph,58 
Justice Thomas wrote: “[T]he accommodations in which Ayala is housed 
are a far sight more spacious than those in which his victims . . . now rest. 
And . . . Ayala will soon have had as much or more time to enjoy those 
accommodations as his victims had time to enjoy this Earth.”59 Thomas’s 
dissent is a reminder that reform of solitary will face many challenges, not 
least among them the perspective that the prisoners therein deserve nothing 
better. 
By October of 2015, after the Supreme Court dismissed Alfred Prieto’s 
case, advocates wondered whether Justice Kennedy’s “invitation to a 
beheading” of the practice of long-term solitary confinement was hollow. 
After all, what case could have presented a more precise question than 
Prieto’s? This Part has suggested that, even had the Court accepted Prieto’s 
case, explicitly considered his conditions of confinement, and ordered 
reforms, solitary confinement might yet persist.  
Still, other prisoners and their advocates mobilized in 2015 to 
challenge the conditions of long-term solitary confinement at the state 
level. Two cases—one in Illinois and one in California—reiterate the 
themes visible in Davis: multi-method approaches bring challenges to 
long-term solitary confinement to the attention of the judiciary, but the 
persistence of solitary confinement, the opacity of the practice, and judicial 
deference to prison officials interact to undermine reform efforts. 
III. ILLINOIS PRISONERS RESPOND TO THE 
INVITATION AND “PRESENT THE ISSUE” 
On June 24, 2015, lawyers in Chicago, Illinois filed a sweeping class 
action complaint on behalf of “all individuals who have been or are 
currently transferred from general prison population into segregation” (in 
other words, all state prisoners): Coleman v. Taylor.60 The Complaint 
alleged that solitary confinement, or “extreme isolation,” is imposed on 
prisoners in Illinois for “long and severely harmful” durations, in violation 
of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
                                                                                                                          
58 Steve Vladek, Opinion Analysis: How Habeas Courts Should Assess Harmless Error in a 
Procedural Batson Challenge, SCOTUSBLOG (June 18, 2015), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/ 
opinion-analysis-how-habeas-courts-should-assess-harmless-error-in-a-procedural-batson-challenge/ 
[https://perma.cc/47RS-95GS]. 
59 Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (Thomas, J., concurring), reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 14 
(2015). 
60 Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Coleman v. Taylor, No. 
1:15-cv-05596 (N.D. Ill. June 24, 2015), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Class Action Complaint].  
 1182 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1167 
punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process.61 
The Complaint sought the implementation of new rules governing 
prisoners’ placement in solitary confinement, based on standards 
promulgated by the American Bar Association for the Treatment of 
Prisoners, including: using the least restrictive conditions of confinement 
necessary for the shortest possible duration; implementing individualized 
determinations of dangerousness prior to placement in solitary 
confinement; and prohibiting the placement of prisoners with serious 
mental illness in long-term solitary confinement.62 
In a sense, this complaint responded directly to Justice Kennedy’s 
invitation in his Davis concurrence, issued just a week earlier. Just as with 
Kennedy’s “multi-method” critique of solitary confinement, Coleman 
relied on a multi-method litigation approach: building on the momentum of 
a successful grassroots effort to close the state’s highest security prison in 
2014, drawing on the findings of an independent non-profit’s (the Vera 
Institute of Justice) analysis of the use of solitary confinement throughout 
the Illinois Department of Corrections in 2011,63 referencing scientific 
research about the mental health impacts of solitary confinement, 
incorporating legal references (including Kennedy’s) into the Complaint, 
and relying on national and international standards governing solitary 
confinement.64 A simple legal argument about Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendment violations would have been inadequate for the Complaint, in 
part because Illinois’ solitary confinement units, like California’s 
Adjustment Center, had previously faced, and survived, litigation in the 
1970s and 2000s.65  
Illinois, in fact, had a long history of continuing to use solitary 
confinement—even expanding its use—in the face of criticisms of the 
practice. In the 2000s, the debates focused on Tamms Correctional Center, 
a supermax opened in 1995, designed explicitly for long-term solitary 
confinement, and the highest security prison in Illinois. From the day the 
facility opened, it faced widespread public scrutiny, including a class 
action lawsuit and a sustained public campaign, coordinated by family 
members of Tamms prisoners and activists in the Chicago area, to close the 
                                                                                                                          
61 Id. at 5. 
62 Id. at 37–45. 
63 Id. at Exhibit E, ECF No. 1-1. 
64 Id. at 6–8. 
65 See United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 712 (7th Cir. 1973) (holding that the 
Due Process Clause is applicable to the revocation of statutory good time credits and punitive 
segregation in inter-prison administrative actions); Black v. Brown, 524 F. Supp. 856, 858 (N.D. Ill. 
1981), rev’d in part, aff’d in part, 688 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1982); Reiter, supra note 10, at 97–99; see 
also Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570, 590 (7th Cir. 2005) (addressing challenges to conditions and 
policies at Tamms, Illinois’ supermax prison that maintained prisoners in long-term solitary 
confinement until it closed in January 2013). 
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institution.66 On January 4, 2013, Illinois Governor Pat Quinn shut down 
Tamms Correctional Center, through a budget line item eliminating 
funding for the institution.67 Until January 2013, Tamms was home to 168 
prisoners. When Tamms closed, these prisoners were quickly transferred to 
other facilities throughout the state; however, most remained in some form 
of solitary confinement.68 Between June of 2012 and June of 2013, Illinois’ 
solitary confinement population actually increased by a total of 257 
prisoners, in spite of the closure of the state’s supermax.69  
These 2012 and 2013 population reports supplemented data provided 
in an independent evaluation, conducted by the Vera Institute of Justice 
and published in 2011. Much of the Coleman Complaint relied on evidence 
from this Vera Institute study, which documented disproportionately long 
stays in solitary confinement, conditions in solitary confinement units that 
were “not acceptable with respect to recreation, showers, mental health 
treatment, or contacts with clinical-services staff,” and inconsistent 
implementation of isolation policies across the state prison system.70 The 
Coleman plaintiffs’ reliance on information gleaned from this independent 
study of the Illinois prison system—rather than on any data regularly 
collected, or publicly available, in the state—reveals just how opaque 
solitary confinement units are. This opacity, in turn, echoes Justice 
Kennedy’s statement in his Davis concurrence that prisoners are “shut 
away—out of sight, out of mind” and exposes how critical transparency is 
to prisoners’ and lawyers’ abilities to even articulate a claim about 
unconstitutional conditions of confinement in isolation units. 
In August of 2015, the Illinois Attorney General filed a Motion to 
Dismiss the Coleman claims.71 In the reply in support of this motion, the 
Attorney General dismissed Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Davis as 
dicta, and distinguished the conditions of confinement in Illinois from 
those Kennedy had described in his concurrence, noting in particular that 
some Illinois prisoners in long-term isolation (locked into their cells for 
                                                                                                                          
66 See Westefer, 422 F.3d at 589 (noting that placement in supermax resulted in the almost 
complete deprivation of “human contact,” attorneys included.). 
67 Amy Fettig, Tamms “Supermax” Prison with Its Inhumane and Ridiculously Expensive Solitary 
Confinement Practices, Is Officially a Thing of the Past!, ACLU BLOG (Jan. 4, 2013), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/tamms-supermax-prison-its-inhumane-and-ridiculously-expensive-solitary-c 
onfinement-practices?redirect=blog/prisoners-rights/tamms-supermax-prison-its-inhumane-and-ridicul 
ously-expensive-solitary [https://perma.cc/8V2X-Y7HH]. 
68 Jamey Dunn, DOC Still Working Out Policy for Former Tamms Prisoners, ILL. ISSUES BLOG 
(Apr. 1, 2013), http://illinoisissuesblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/doc-still-working-out-policy-for-former. 
html [https://perma.cc/E3YL-U4T5]. 
69 Class Action Complaint, supra note 60, at 9; id. at Exhibit A, ECF No. 1-2. 
70 Id. at 16. 
71 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, Coleman v. Taylor, No. 1:15-cv-05596 (N.D. 
Ill. Aug. 18, 2015), ECF No. 24. 
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twenty-three or more hours per day72) have cellmates and, therefore, are 
not in “solitary confinement.”73 These kinds of negotiations over both the 
labels used to describe conditions of confinement, and the specific details 
of conditions—how many hours prisoners have outside of their cells or 
how much contact they have with medical professionals, for instance—
reveal how much control prison officials have not only over the conditions 
of prisoners’ lives, but over how these conditions are described and 
interpreted in legal documents.  
On February 11, 2016, Judge Zagel dismissed the Coleman Complaint 
without prejudice.74 The court found that the plaintiffs’ conditions did not 
“amount to ‘extreme isolation,’” did not constitute “disproportionate 
punishment,” and that none of the conditions were severe enough to trigger 
either a “liberty interest” or the associated due process rights.75 In reaching 
this finding, the court relied primarily on the precedent of Wilkinson v. 
Austin, the one Supreme Court case to consider the constitutionality of 
long-term solitary confinement, and the same case Justice Kennedy himself 
referenced in his Ayala concurrence. Once again, a claim seemingly 
responsive to Justice Kennedy’s invitation to present a case challenging 
solitary confinement, was dismissed. 
The Coleman plaintiffs deployed a multi-method litigation approach, 
gathering data not just from prisoner plaintiffs, but from an array of 
independent experts, and building on the momentum of the public 
campaign to close Tamms. But these prisoner plaintiffs faced exactly the 
issues that have plagued earlier attempts to reform solitary confinement: 
the persistence of solitary confinement even in the face of reform efforts, 
the opacity of solitary confinement units, and the broad administrative 
discretion governing the practice. 
IV. CALIFORNIA PRISONERS PROPOSE “WORKABLE ALTERNATIVES” 
In California, a few months after the Coleman case was filed in 
Illinois, prison officials agreed to settle a six-year-old, class action case: 
Ashker v. Brown.76 Just as in the Coleman case, Ashker raised challenges to 
                                                                                                                          
72 Class Action Complaint, supra note 60, at 2. 
73 Reply in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 4, Coleman v. 
Taylor, No. 1:15-cv-05596 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2016), ECF No. 24. 
74 Memorandum Opinion and Order at 8–9, Coleman v. Taylor, No. 1:15-cv-05596 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 
11, 2016), ECF No. 29. The plaintiffs, however, are planning to file an amended complaint, so the case 
remains technically pending as of May 2016. E-mail from lead counsel, Alan Mills, to author (Apr. 13, 
2016) (on file with author). 
75 Id. at 5–8. 
76 Summary of Settlement Terms in Ashker v. Brown (Governor of California), PRISONER 
HUNGER STRIKE SOLIDARITY (Sept. 9, 2015), https://prisonerhungerstrikesolidarity.wordpress.com/ 
2015/09/09/summary-of-settlement-terms-in-ashker-v-brown-governor-of-california/ [https://perma.cc/ 
Y3ZF-96GR]. 
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both the conditions of solitary confinement and the procedures by which 
prison officials assign prisoners to these conditions. The Ashker case, 
however, survived motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, and 
entered settlement negotiations. On August 31, 2015, California prison 
officials agreed to settle.77 An analysis of this case again reveals both the 
critical role of multi-method litigation approaches and the potential 
implementation challenges in the face of the opaque and discretionary 
practices governing the persistent and ongoing use of solitary confinement. 
Two prisoners, Todd Ashker and Danny Troxell, initiated Ashker v. 
Brown, pro se, in 2009.78 The initial motions in the case attracted little 
attention. Then, between 2011 and 2013, Ashker and Troxell, along with a 
few dozen others in long-term solitary confinement in California’s 
supermax, the Pelican Bay State Prison Security Housing Unit (SHU), led 
three separate hunger strikes to protest both the harsh conditions of their 
confinement and the administrative process by which prison officials had 
assigned them to these conditions. The strike essentially amplified the 
claims in the Ashker lawsuit.79  
To coordinate the hunger strikes, prisoners set aside racial divisions 
and collaborated across previously mortally divisive gang rivalries.80 Each 
of the hunger strike leaders, including Ashker and Troxell, was serving an 
indefinite term in isolation as a “validated” gang member.81 In California at 
the time, three pieces of evidence, like a tattoo, being in possession of 
“revolutionary” literature, or having a note from another validated gang 
member, could result in validation as a gang member and assignment to 
isolation for the duration of a prisoner’s sentence.82 In August 2011, during 
the first hunger strike, prison officials released the first ever snapshot data 
about how many prisoners had been in the Pelican Bay SHU and for how 
long: more than 500 had been in total isolation for more than ten years.83 
After the first hunger strike, a team of civil rights counsel (including 
                                                                                                                          
77 Settlement Agreement, supra note 4. 
78 Ashker v. Governor of California, CENTER FOR CONST. RTS. (May 30, 2012), http://ccrjustice 
.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/ashker-v-brown [https://perma.cc/LMM6-385B]. 
79 Prisoners’ Demands, PRISONER HUNGER STRIKE SOLIDARITY (Apr. 3, 2011), https://prisoner 
hungerstrikesolidarity.wordpress.com/the-prisoners-demands-2/ [https://perma.cc/2GRN-AUPR]. 
80 For a discussion of the institutionalized racism endemic within the California prison system, see 
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 513–14 (2005); Phil Goodman, “It’s Just Black, White, or 
Hispanic”: An Observational Study of Racializing Moves in California’s Segregated Prison Reception 
Centers”, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 735, 735–37 (2008). 
81 Anthony Skeens, Inside the SHU Part 1: Isolation, DEL NORTE TRIPLICATE (June 24, 2013), 
http://www.triplicate.com/News/Local-News/Inside-the-SHU-Part-1-isolation [http://web.archive.org/ 
web/20160529064235/http://www.triplicate.com/News/Local-News/Inside-the-SHU-Part-1-isolation]. 
82  For a discussion of the validation policy then in place, see Reiter, supra note 46, at 542. 
83 Julie Small, Under Scrutiny, Pelican Bay Prison Officials Say They Target Only Gang Leaders, 
S. CAL. PUB. RADIO BROADCAST (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.scpr.org/news/2011/08/23/28382/pelican 
-bay-prison-officials-say-they-lock-gang-bo/ [http://web.archive.org/web/20131001033957/http://www 
.scpr.org/news/2011/08/23/28382/pelican-bay-prison-officials-say-they-lock-gang-bo/]. 
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Legal Services for Prisoners with Children, based in San Francisco, and the 
Center for Constitutional Rights, based in New York City) joined the 
prisoners’ case. In May 2013, the legal team sought to certify the class of 
500 people who had been in isolation in the Pelican Bay SHU for ten years 
or more.84 In June 2014, the federal district court judge overseeing the case 
certified the class. Between the filing of the motion for class certification 
and the actual certification, in August 2013, the prisoners led a third 
hunger strike that involved 30,000 prisoners; some refused food for sixty 
days. Each hunger strike attracted national and international attention—and 
escalating condemnation.85 
Between 2011 and 2014, during the hunger strikes and ongoing Ashker 
litigation, prison officials sought to maintain their control over isolation in 
California. First, even though the Ashker plaintiffs used non-violent tools 
(hunger strikes and litigation) to seek reform, prison officials characterized 
them as “convicted murderers who are putting lives at risk to advance their 
own agenda of violence” both in affidavits filed in Ashker and in public 
commentaries in state newspapers.86 Second, prison officials initiated “pre-
emptive, but superficial reforms” to the policies by which prisoners were 
validated as gang members and assigned to indefinite terms in solitary 
confinement.87 (As in Illinois, isolation policies in the Pelican Bay 
supermax had already been litigated, and prison officials had already 
secured the right to maintain at least some prisoners in long-term 
isolation.88) Prison officials even transferred eight of the ten named 
plaintiffs in the Ashker litigation out of the Pelican Bay SHU, in an 
apparent effort to moot the class. The judge overseeing the case issued an 
order expanding the class to include prisoners anywhere in the state who 
                                                                                                                          
84 Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion & Motion for Class Certification; Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities at 15, Ashker v. Brown, No. 4:09-cv-05796-CW  (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2013), https://ccrjust 
ice.org/sites/default/files/assets/195%20Motion%20for%20Class%20Certification.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/3L6V-CCWJ]. 
85 See generally Reiter, supra note 16, at 603 (“[T]he [third] strike played a critical role in 
drawing local, national, and international attention to the practice of long-term solitary confinement in 
the United States . . . [which] led to concrete changes in the prisoners’ conditions of 
confinement . . . .”). 
86 Jeffrey Beard, Hunger Strike in California Prisons Is a Gang Power Play, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 6 
2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/06/opinion/la-oe-beard-prison-hunger-strike-20130806 [htt 
ps://perma.cc/BXS7-HWKY]. 
87 Id.; Keramet Reiter, (Un)Settling Solitary Confinement in California’s Prisons, SOC. JUST. 
(Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.socialjusticejournal.org/?p=3214 [http://web.archive.org/web/2016022209 
1137/http://www.socialjusticejournal.org/unsettling-solitary-confinement-in-californias-prisons/]. 
88 See generally Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp 1146, 1271 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (stating that under 
precedent and statute, state officials may not subject a prisoner to solitary confinement unless he 
1) presents a threat to himself or others, 2) endangers institutional security, or 3) jeopardizes the 
integrity of a criminal investigation). 
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had spent ten or more years in isolation.89  
In August of 2015, the prisoner plaintiffs filed ten comprehensive (and 
extremely critical) expert reports documenting the myriad detrimental 
impacts—from legal, psychological, and medical perspectives—of long-
term solitary confinement.90 Just a few weeks later, the parties announced a 
settlement in the case.  
The provisions of the settlement represented drastic changes to both 
the conditions in and policies governing solitary confinement in California. 
Prison officials agreed to assign only prisoners who break specific in-
prison rules to solitary confinement and to a hard cap of five years on any 
term in solitary confinement. This eliminated both the policy of validating 
gang members based on three pieces of evidence of gang association and 
the policy of assigning these validated gang members to solitary 
confinement indefinitely.91 The settlement applied retroactively: all 
prisoners who had spent more than five years in solitary confinement 
(including all the Ashker class members) would be moved into the general 
prison population within one year. And officials agreed to collect data 
about the characteristics of populations in solitary confinement over the 
subsequent two years and to provide this data to plaintiffs’ attorneys, to aid 
in the monitoring of the settlement.92 
The combination of coordinated public action by the hunger striking 
prisoners; the data about California’s solitary confinement practices, which 
the media requested and published during those hunger strikes; and the 
assembling of experts to produce reports all contributed to a multi-method 
litigation strategy. This strategy mobilized much more than straightforward 
legal arguments to pressure the state to change its solitary confinement 
policies; outside of the courts, state prison officials faced persistent and 
harsh public condemnation.  
However, the resistance of state officials, from the way they 
characterized prisoner plaintiffs as advancing agendas of violence 
throughout the litigation to their attempts to moot the Ashker class by 
moving prisoners out of the Pelican Bay SHU, suggests a high potential for 
resistance to implementation of the Ashker settlement. After all, long-term 
solitary confinement has been in use in California, as in Illinois, since the 
1970s, in spite of years of litigation and multiple attempts at reform. In 
sum, the progress of the Ashker case over six years of litigation, and the 
                                                                                                                          
89 Order Granting Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Complaint at 2, 16, Ashker v. Brown, 
No. 4:09-cv-05796-CW (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2015), https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/ 
06/Order%20on%20Motion%20to%20Supplement%20Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/K63V-6KNT]. 
90 Expert Reports in Ashker v. Brown, CENTER FOR CONST. RTS. (Aug. 3, 2015), https://ccr 
justice.org/expert-reports-ashker-v-brown [https://perma.cc/WX9H-S99R]. 
91 Settlement Agreement, supra note 4, at 4–5, 12. 
92 Id. at 8–10, 13–16.  
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settlement to which prisoners and prison officials ultimately agreed, 
reveals not only the importance of multi-method approaches to challenges 
to solitary confinement, but also the ongoing persistence of solitary 
confinement as a largely invisible practice, primarily controlled by prison 
officials. 
V. LOST LESSONS 
Too many of the attempts to reform U.S. prison conditions generally 
and solitary confinement specifically ignore two lessons of history. First, 
solitary confinement has existed in U.S. prisons since the very first 
penitentiaries opened in Pennsylvania and New York in the 1820s.93 
Though the Supreme Court condemned solitary confinement in 1890 as a 
“further terror [beyond a sentence of death] and peculiar mark of infamy” 
(as Justice Kennedy noted in his Davis concurrence), the practice 
continued.94 In the 1970s, every major case challenging state and federal 
prison conditions—and there were hundreds of such cases at the peak of 
the civil rights movement—condemned the dark, dirty, abusive, sometimes 
even crowded conditions in isolation.95 Courts ordered improvements to 
these conditions of confinement: less dirt, more light and air.96 In the 1990s 
and 2000s in Madrid in California and Westefer in Illinois, courts ordered 
further improvements to these conditions of confinement: better policies 
and more procedures governing placement in isolation. Still, the practice of 
solitary confinement continued. In light of this continuity, current efforts to 
refine, reform, and develop alternatives to solitary confinement may be 
limited in their long-term impact, absent more explicit initiatives to restrict 
the number of people in solitary confinement, or even to abolish the 
practice entirely.  
Second, litigation has provided one mechanism for oversight of 
solitary confinement, and has also forced moments of transparency, 
revealing the abuses that can take place deep inside the prisons within 
prisons of solitary confinement.97 But litigation has also been a force for 
perfecting solitary confinement. Following the improvements to solitary 
confinement ordered in the 1970s, the practice continued to be used, albeit 
                                                                                                                          
93 Ashley T. Rubin, A Neo-Institutional Account of Prison Diffusion, 49 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 365, 
378–79 (2015). 
94 Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2209 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting In re Medley, 134 
U.S. 160, 170 (1890)), reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 14 (2015). 
95 See generally Reiter, supra note 10, at 103 (describing the improvements made to prisoner 
living conditions as a result of copious litigation in the 1970s). 
96 Id. 
97 See Reiter, supra note 10, at 86 (“These lawsuits resulted in court orders which subjugated 
prisons, and sometimes entire state departments of corrections, to expert monitoring, federal court 
oversight, and enforceable promises to alter and improve conditions of confinement.”). 
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in a cleaner, brighter, and less crowded form.98 In 1995, considering one of 
the first challenges to modern, hygienic supermax facilities like the Pelican 
Bay SHU, Judge Thelton Henderson of the Northern district court of 
California said the conditions pushed the boundaries of the humanly 
tolerable, and ordered that at least the mentally ill should be uniformly 
excluded from such conditions of confinement.99 And yet, twenty years 
later, across the United States, states are still defending the placement of 
the mentally ill in solitary confinement, as evidenced by the complaint in 
Coleman in Illinois. 
No matter how strong the case, how solid the evidence, and how firmly 
Justice Kennedy condemns the practice of solitary confinement, neither 
Kennedy nor the Supreme Court can single-handedly wipe out our national 
tradition of solitary confinement. Actual elimination (or even reductions) 
of solitary confinement will require concerted effort to incorporate critics, 
intellectual experts, and especially the prison officials who manage 
overcrowded and dangerous prisons day in and day out, in designing real 
alternatives, subject to consistent and persistent oversight. 
                                                                                                                          
98 See id. (describing how reform measures for isolation conditions following the 1970s litigation 
led to the development of today’s principles of such confinement). 
99 See Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp 1146, 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 
